Martial Law FAQ: Why/How Did Korea Give Martial Law the big Nope?

So in my previous post I wrote about how and why Pres. Yoon Seok-yeol set his political career on fire.

In this post, I’m going to talk about the first of two big questions that have been on my mind ever since.

Question one: Why/How did South Korea put the Kibosh on Martial Law so Quickly?

I think there are a few factors feeding into this that are relevant to Pres. Yoon’s situation, and also to the next big question. 

The first thing, I think, is that President Yoon really, badly miscalculated what South Korea’s people would put up with, badly misreading South Korean peoples’ desire for a thriving democracy. And honestly, this is the headsmacking strange part for me. It should have been easy for him to properly calculate this. Like, really really, REALLY easy. 

Ya see, go right back to when my dad was born in the 1940s and earlier and every election in Canada has been free and fair. We haven’t been invaded or colonized. There have been ups and downs, and sure, the political process has gotten sticky and even raucous a few times (President Pierre Trudeau once declared martial law because a terrorist group was kidnapping politicians and threatening more), but every Prime Minister has more or less respected the will of Canada’s voters, at least insofar as giving up power when defeated at the ballot box, and acting as if their legitimacy as a leader was given to him by the people. That is a remarkable track record of stability that might even be called boring, and yeah, stability can breed complacency. People can forget how much it means, and how rare it has been historically, to have a stable democracy with a long unbroken string of free and fair elections, and ruling parties who have at least nominally been concerned with using the state’s power to try and make life better for the citizens.

But in South Korea, our first free and fair democratic election is within living memory. Within MY living memory, and I’m not that old, even if kids today can’t rap the intro to Fresh Prince of Bel-Air. 1987, a year I remember, was the first time South Koreans voted for their president without enough corruption, cheating or other shenanigans to doubt the outcome. 

Put another way: South Koreans who are alive today remember choking on tear gas, facing down firehoses and truncheons and worse, in demanding their own democracy. South Koreans who are alive today ran from bullets in 1980 Gwangju, when shitstain president Chun Doo-hwan pointed the military’s guns at his own people. Oh, by the way, Chun Doo-hwan’s military coup? That was the last time a Korean president declared martial law. South Koreans who are alive today can tell their kids and grandkids what democracy means, why it matters, and warn them about signs of leaders losing respect for the will of the people, because they saw it with their own eyes, and bore the bruises on their own arms and legs. In fact, if the average age of South Korea’s elected representatives are in line with most countries’, many of today’s elected representatives are about the right age to have been there themselves in 1987, adding their voices to the democracy protests that finally turned the tied. They know firsthand how hard you have to fight to get democracy back once it’s lost, because they were called upon to fight it!

Dear readers, that is NOT a generation to mess with. That is a fuck around and find out generation, and they will show you what they are made of again and again. 

Yoon fucked around, and he is nowhere near finished finding out. 

And that is the main point of this blog post.

There’s more, but it isn’t as important.

Why else did Yoon’s coup fail? If you want to undermine democracy, you need one of two things, and probably both: you need the people (or at least a large enough segment of the people to effectively bully, browbeat, intimidate or gaslight the rest), or you need the military on your side. Yoon did not have the people: he is/was never a highly charismatic leader who drew people to his side, or caused people to feel more loyalty to him than they felt to their democratic institutions. He’s so uncharismatic that even now, after weeks of scandal, I can’t picture his face in my head.

As far as I know (and please correct me if I’m wrong, readers,) Yoon didn’t even had some meaningfully influential sector on his side — all the buddhists, all the christians, all the union members, everyone in the southeast, everyone above age fifty or some such group— the kind of group that might rally to his side and try to drag along the rest. One or two demographics solidly on his side would have given him… not quite a fighting chance on its own, but it would have given him a puncher’s chance maybe, if everything broke exactly right for him. But Yoon? His popularity dropped within a month of becoming president, and his approval rating has been in the toilet for the entire 2 1/2 years of his presidency so far. This made it easier for opposition politicians to defy him, and it also meant that he’d never have enough people on his side to annoy/bully/badger the rest of the population into submission/resignation. There was nobody willing to break into a government building for him, and even when the police did it on direct orders, they weren’t happy about it. They did as little as they could while holding the positions they’d been assigned, not putting up a vigorous or well-organized defense as Korea’s people and politicians surrounded the National Assembly buildings and got the lawmakers over the fence so they could vote to repeal the martial law order. 

In general, Korea’s people were surprised by his move, against it from the drop, and showed where they stood. Compare with 1980, when Chun Doo-hwan successfully repressed a protest movement: in 1980, Chun Doo-hwan had friends highly placed all across the Korean military, and he was a military man himself. He know he could count on the generals coming to his side over president Choi Kyu-hah. Yoon didn’t have the military or the people. 

There was no way this coup-attempt succeeds. Not from this president, in this country, at this time, against this opposition.