Martial Law FAQ: Why/How Did Korea Give Martial Law the big Nope?

So in my previous post I wrote about how and why Pres. Yoon Seok-yeol set his political career on fire.

In this post, I’m going to talk about the first of two big questions that have been on my mind ever since.

Question one: Why/How did South Korea put the Kibosh on Martial Law so Quickly?

I think there are a few factors feeding into this that are relevant to Pres. Yoon’s situation, and also to the next big question. 

The first thing, I think, is that President Yoon really, badly miscalculated what South Korea’s people would put up with, badly misreading South Korean peoples’ desire for a thriving democracy. And honestly, this is the headsmacking strange part for me. It should have been easy for him to properly calculate this. Like, really really, REALLY easy. 

Ya see, go right back to when my dad was born in the 1940s and earlier and every election in Canada has been free and fair. We haven’t been invaded or colonized. There have been ups and downs, and sure, the political process has gotten sticky and even raucous a few times (President Pierre Trudeau once declared martial law because a terrorist group was kidnapping politicians and threatening more), but every Prime Minister has more or less respected the will of Canada’s voters, at least insofar as giving up power when defeated at the ballot box, and acting as if their legitimacy as a leader was given to him by the people. That is a remarkable track record of stability that might even be called boring, and yeah, stability can breed complacency. People can forget how much it means, and how rare it has been historically, to have a stable democracy with a long unbroken string of free and fair elections, and ruling parties who have at least nominally been concerned with using the state’s power to try and make life better for the citizens.

But in South Korea, our first free and fair democratic election is within living memory. Within MY living memory, and I’m not that old, even if kids today can’t rap the intro to Fresh Prince of Bel-Air. 1987, a year I remember, was the first time South Koreans voted for their president without enough corruption, cheating or other shenanigans to doubt the outcome. 

Put another way: South Koreans who are alive today remember choking on tear gas, facing down firehoses and truncheons and worse, in demanding their own democracy. South Koreans who are alive today ran from bullets in 1980 Gwangju, when shitstain president Chun Doo-hwan pointed the military’s guns at his own people. Oh, by the way, Chun Doo-hwan’s military coup? That was the last time a Korean president declared martial law. South Koreans who are alive today can tell their kids and grandkids what democracy means, why it matters, and warn them about signs of leaders losing respect for the will of the people, because they saw it with their own eyes, and bore the bruises on their own arms and legs. In fact, if the average age of South Korea’s elected representatives are in line with most countries’, many of today’s elected representatives are about the right age to have been there themselves in 1987, adding their voices to the democracy protests that finally turned the tied. They know firsthand how hard you have to fight to get democracy back once it’s lost, because they were called upon to fight it!

Dear readers, that is NOT a generation to mess with. That is a fuck around and find out generation, and they will show you what they are made of again and again. 

Yoon fucked around, and he is nowhere near finished finding out. 

And that is the main point of this blog post.

There’s more, but it isn’t as important.

Why else did Yoon’s coup fail? If you want to undermine democracy, you need one of two things, and probably both: you need the people (or at least a large enough segment of the people to effectively bully, browbeat, intimidate or gaslight the rest), or you need the military on your side. Yoon did not have the people: he is/was never a highly charismatic leader who drew people to his side, or caused people to feel more loyalty to him than they felt to their democratic institutions. He’s so uncharismatic that even now, after weeks of scandal, I can’t picture his face in my head.

As far as I know (and please correct me if I’m wrong, readers,) Yoon didn’t even had some meaningfully influential sector on his side — all the buddhists, all the christians, all the union members, everyone in the southeast, everyone above age fifty or some such group— the kind of group that might rally to his side and try to drag along the rest. One or two demographics solidly on his side would have given him… not quite a fighting chance on its own, but it would have given him a puncher’s chance maybe, if everything broke exactly right for him. But Yoon? His popularity dropped within a month of becoming president, and his approval rating has been in the toilet for the entire 2 1/2 years of his presidency so far. This made it easier for opposition politicians to defy him, and it also meant that he’d never have enough people on his side to annoy/bully/badger the rest of the population into submission/resignation. There was nobody willing to break into a government building for him, and even when the police did it on direct orders, they weren’t happy about it. They did as little as they could while holding the positions they’d been assigned, not putting up a vigorous or well-organized defense as Korea’s people and politicians surrounded the National Assembly buildings and got the lawmakers over the fence so they could vote to repeal the martial law order. 

In general, Korea’s people were surprised by his move, against it from the drop, and showed where they stood. Compare with 1980, when Chun Doo-hwan successfully repressed a protest movement: in 1980, Chun Doo-hwan had friends highly placed all across the Korean military, and he was a military man himself. He know he could count on the generals coming to his side over president Choi Kyu-hah. Yoon didn’t have the military or the people. 

There was no way this coup-attempt succeeds. Not from this president, in this country, at this time, against this opposition.

Martial Law FAQ: setting a political career on fire, why it didn't happen in Korea, but it still might in America

 Okay… this one’ll probably be short.

So yes, South Korea’s (for now) President Yoon Seok-yeol declared Martial Law a few weeks ago, in a spasm of frustration about being blocked from his agenda by the opposition party (hey there buddy… politics get you down? Then don’t go into… politics.) The first impeachment vote failed for various political wrangling reasons, but public pressure grew, more politicians from Yoon’s party flipped, or decided it was politically advantageous to distance themselves from Yoon, and on December 14th, the National Assembly voted to impeach him.

As far as I can gather, declaring martial law this way was a pretty harebrained scheme, poorly developed, and clumsily delivered, and as soon as he did it, the backlash was swift, furious, and unambiguous. Korea’s political scene, and Korea’s people responded with a big, emphatic, “Nuh uh.” In the middle of the night, no less!

There have been tons of summaries, reviews and takes on this, it’s been a few weeks, and it’s all been very dramatic, so I don’t have a huge amount to add about Pres. (for now) Yoon’s move.

1. It was half-baked and poorly planned.

2. It could only have been half-baked and poorly planned, because, put very simply, any advisor with enough sense to develop a better plan, would also have enough sense to tell Yoon this was the stupidest idea from a world leader since Trump floated the idea of bombing hurricanes. Or injecting bleach to fight covid. Whichever of those you think is stupider. If you are limited to the advisors who don’t have much sense to begin with, this is what you get.

3. Some dipshits on youtube were talking about Korean politicians who broadcast their efforts to get into the Korean national assembly buildings live online, as if this was some hilarious attention-grabbing stunt that was totally epic (or whatever the kids are calling it these days. Fleek. No cap. Dab. Sus. Brat.) It was not. Keep in mind, youtube doofuses (Youtufuses), that under Martial Law, people can be arrested without reason… but it becomes a lot harder to arrest a prominent politician if he can say ‘See that camera? 15000 viewers are watching you arrest me right now. Some of them are recording the clip. Are you sure this is how you want to become famous?” There was a very, very, very good reason for him to be live streaming his effort to climb the fence and get into the National Assembly buildings.

4. Since Martial Law was overturned, protests have been growing in size, and the first effort to impeach him failed in the National Assembly when nearly all the representatives in the same party as Pres. Yoon left the National Assembly, so that they couldn’t vote, meaning the vote to impeach didn’t reach a quorum (a certain percentage of all representatives have to be present for some kinds of votes, or the vote isn’t valid — or else you could pass laws by saying ‘Everybody from my party, let’s meet at the legislative building at 3am, and we’ll pass these laws unanimously. Mwahaha!”) On December 14, as public pressure continued to grow, including street protests that have sustained impressive numbers, a movement to impeach passed.

5. This means the impeachment will be referred to Korea’s Constitutional Court — kind of like USA’s Supreme Court, with less corruption and politicization (low bar to clear). They will investigate the case, and ultimately either uphold the impeachment, removing Yoon from office, or overturn it, and return him to power.

6. How shameful if Korea’s conservative party has two conservative presidents impeached in a row! How embarrassing that after being utterly humiliated by the Park Geun-hye scandal, they have apparently learned nothing.

It’s kind of weird to me that two presidents in a row, from the same party, have proven so unfit… usually the kinds of politicians that survive long enough and rise high enough to become a party nominee have learned to be cagey, careful, and prudent by then. Politics is a meat grinder, sure, but the folks who reach the top tend to be survivors. And there are lots of ways politicians can be stupid, rash and corrupt in ways that won’t result in outright removal. Lots of scandals blow over.

It seems they didn’t after Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, but I really hope Korea’s conservative party will now have a serious rethink of how they choose candidates.

7. Part of the rhetoric Yoon used to justify declaring martial law was one of the old saws of the Korean right: claiming that politicians on the left were either in league with, or actually were North Korean agents, sent to destabilize South Korea. There is a very long tradition of hard right Korean politicians calling their opponents Norks (usually without evidence, or at least unconcerned whether there is evidence or not) to delegitimize them, to undermine the validity of their positions or the policies they argued for. When Chun Doo-hwan’s men gunned down student protesters in Gwangju, he arrested the leaders under allegations of them being North Korean spies (they weren’t) and future President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Kim Daejung was arrested and nearly murdered under the same pretense. Waves of union-busting and protest suppression has been done under the same pretense. When Koreans demanded democracy in 1987, people accused the movement’s leaders of being in league with North Korea as a pretense to illegally arrest them. Every time someone suggests South Korea adopt any policy further to the left than “Perhaps it is the government’s job to rein in out-of-control corporate greed,” somebody calls them a North Korean commie pinko, either out loud in front of cameras, or in one of those viral chain text messages my Father-in-law receives.

And… you know what? Can the fact Yoon used that same stupid, ungrounded accusation as justification in his doomed coup attempt please be the dying breath of this move? Can we just accept that some people support progressive policies for their own sake, and not because they were compromised by North Korean spies? Pretty please could that stupid worn-out loser’s pot-shot now be retired from public use?

That would be nice.

8. Yoon Seok-yeol was a prosecutor before he became President. Before him, previous president Lee Myung-bak, the businessman, had trouble being president after being a CEO. And it strikes me that being a prosecutor is a really different type of leadership than being a politician. A prosecutor chooses their team, decides the parameters of their investigation, decides which investigations to pursue and which to abandon, and then builds the strongest case they can with their team, letting a judge or jury decide on the result. It’s a very one-sided approach to an issue, because the defense takes the other side, and you get a clear outcome with the judge and jury’s findings. Almost nothing about this process resembles the process politicians use to create and pass legislation.

The type of leadership you need to pass a law or a bill or a budget is completely different. It’s communication and compromise intensive, it requires listening and balancing different people and different groups’ wants, needs, and dealbreaker red lines. Being a CEO also looks nothing like politics, by the way — you can fire your opposition as a CEO, but you can’t fire the opposition leader in the national assembly. You can’t hire the team you want when some high-level government positions have to be approved by the house of representatives, who get to nix appointments they dislike. Every step of the political process is about persuading, negotiating, playing ball and adjusting to the needs of the other side, and calculating what result a move will get, but also how it will be perceived by the public, in ways that CEOs and prosecutors don’t really have to do in the course of their job.

Perhaps, just maybe… government would be more effective if parties nominated candidates for president… who actually had political experience?

Just thinking out loud here.

But here are the two big questions that have been bopping around in my head since I got text messages from my American friends (it was late in Korea: most people were sleeping) asking, “Hey Rob… just got the news. Everything OK there?” (I was watching a movie — I actually had to pause and google ‘Korea news’ to find out what it was)…

Question one: 

Why/How did South Korea put the Kibosh on Martial Law so Quickly?

I have a few answers, but I’m going to hit publish now and answer my two questions in future posts. So stay tuned!